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ComIption,  according to Rose-Ackennan (1996, p. 365), "occurs when officials use their
positions of public  trust for private gain."  It is "an extralegal institution used by individuals  or
That is,  corruption involves groups to gain influence over the bureaucracy" (Leff,  1964, p. 8).
transactions, typically  between private parties and public  officials,  designed to  manipulate the
machinery of government.  It may be of the pennission-seeking type (quotas, licenses, pennits,
competition-harassing  type.
Corruption  is  closely associated with  bribery  which  ha.o;  been recognized since the  15
Kleptocracy  and high corruption  and bribery is implicitly applied  to lower level public officers.
may be usefully regarded  as  part of the same  "third-best" theory of government.
theory of coffilption  and imbeds it-in the more general  political  economy  of public policy.
Lessons from the Philil2l2ines
Imported
facilitate lower duties. Such  operations  had the tacit approval of higher authorities who were repaid
with both bribe shares  and political support.
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Not only did the centralization  of  coffilption  pemrlt both higher bribe collection and lower
excess  burden (Schleifer and Vishny), it pennitted greater  grand comIption as well.  According to
some estimates, the Marcoses and their cronies were able to accumulate  $10-20 billions  in  assets
from various  operations.
But  the styles of  grand c,orruption were quite different even within  the Marcos regime.
Imelda  Marcos  allegedly  extorted  30%  of government  contracts  under  her  authority  as Governor  of
President Marcos,  in  contrast,  devised Metro Manila and Minister of  Human Settlements.
numerous schemes  to extract wealth under  the guise of legitimacy..
2.1 Legitimate Corrup;tion
One  of the most  ingenious  of such  schemes  involved  the  Philippine  coconut  industry. First
a media campaign was launched  to convince fanners and consumers of coconut products that they
were being exploited by unscrupulous  middlemen.  Next an 18% tax was imposed on the gross (!)
sales of  coconuts and copra.  Fanners were told that this tax was in exchange for  shares in the
UCPB, however, newly  fonned United Coconut  Planters  Bank, headed  by Marcos' best  crony.
had the status of a quasi-public corporation whose collections and disbursements  were not fully
revealed. UCPB then  acquired  UNICOM, a holding company  for coconut  oil processing  plants,
which  quickly  monopolized' the  industry  thru  bureaucratic harassment of  the  competition.
UNICOM's  monopoly position was further enhanced  by banning e.xports  of copra, thus leaving
sale of whole  coconuts to the very small domestic market as the only alternative outlet to the oil
industry.  These  policies  allowed UCPB/UNICOM to substantially  increase  the wedge between
prices paid to farmers and charged  to consumers  (Clarete and Roumasset),
Schleifer  and  Vishny  characterize  the Philippines  under  Marcos  as effectively  a monarchy.
While the Republic of the Philippines nominally retained its democratic  institutions under Marcos,
the legislature, judiciary,  as well  as provincia:! and local  government offices  were  effectively
centralized under the presidency.  Nonetheless, Marcos' power was also contingent on his ability
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to  maintain  the appearance  of  legitimacy. Once the government  was no  longer viewed as
legitimate, due to  the  assassination  of  Benigno  Aquino  and other developments, so  too  was
popular support, and the "People's Revolution" to overthrow the regime.
Thus,  unlike  a kleptocracy modeled along the lines of  Brennen and Buchanan's [1980]
Leviathan, Marcos was  not free to  directly  pocket the proceeds from  the  18  %' tax. and other
elements  of  the "wedge." Further  entrepreneurship was  needed to  develop  schemes that
transferred  wealth  of the  quasi-public  entity  into private  hands. One  clever  scheme  involved  using
UCPB funds to purchase and plant an African hybrid  variety on a plantation given to the head of
UNICOM  as "compensation"  for  are relatively small  amount of  land  that he  lost  under the
country's land reform program.  Moreover coconut fanners were mandated  to replant theit"  coconut
fanns to these  same  hybrids on the grounds  that  their higher  yields would improve  both fanners
yields and  the  national  economy.
In summary, under  the guise  of what appeared  to be legitimate  public programs,  a single
private individual was given a monopsony  on coconuts,  a monopoly on coconut  oil,  and a
monopoly  on the one variety of  coconut trees that fanners were required to buy. Moreover  the
effective  owner  of  these industries was  not required to buy  them with  private  funds  but was
effectively  granted  them  thru  the allocation  of public  funds
2.2 Secrec~  and Stul2idit~
The coconut  oil Lucrative  as it was,  however, the scheme was "too  clever by  half."
monopoly,  popularly  known as COPEC, stockpiled oil in order to raise the world  price.  The plot
backfired  when the oil went rancid and,  when it was eventually sold,  spoiled the reputation of
Philippine oil.  As the result of this 18% tax and the nuisance value of the replanting requirement,
the Philippines  irrevocably  lost  its  position  as the  world's  leading  exporter of  coconut oil
Moreover,  the  government was not in a position to  exploit  its oil  monopoly  on  the domestic
Cooking oil,  like rice and gasolil)e  is regarded  as a basic commodity  among urban market.
Finally, the African consumers and the political repercussions  of a rise in price can be severe.
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dwarf hybrid program was a bust. Farmers were unwilling  to replant, even under the threat of  law
and  a highly subsidized  price,  and  the program  became  unenforceable.
These  elTors  suggest  a corollary to the proposition  that  bribery  is more  distortionary  than
taxation, because  the  necessity  of  secrecy leads government  officials to  discourage  more
transparent  activities  in order  to stimulate  the  more  "bribable"  sectors  (Scheifer  and  Vishny),  to say
nothing of differences in revenue disposition. While  coconut scheme  described above was  not
entirely secret, neither  was it the product  of thorough  public debate,  which likely would have
partially overcome the failure to foresee adverse  consequences. That is,  secrecy  not only begets
inefficiency  in intersectoral  resource  allocation,  it begets  collective  stupidity.
...
I  Mandatory  Hybrid  Purchase  I
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Figure 1: "Legitimate"  Corruption of Philippine Coconut Policies
2.3 Post-Marcos Evolution of Corru~tion
Mer  the legitimacy of the Marcos administration had waned and the government of  self-
proclaimed "housewife"  and widow of Benigno Aquino came into power, corruption
returned to the decentralized, Spanish-mestizo-dominated  form that had prevailed before Marcos'
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second  tenn.  I
The loss of  central control of comIption has two deleterious  effects. First the degree  of
"theft"  from the highest level of  government increases. This in turn feeds the further spread of
corruption  thru a kind of Gresham's Law (corrupt officials  outcompete honest officials  for jobs
and bribe-giving  producers drive out their competitors: "observance  of  law does not survive in a
competitive  market" (Schleifer  and  Vishny, p. 604). Second,  and relatedly,  the loss of central
authority allows  independent  entrepreneurs  to create  or simply add more roadblocks to business
ventures, in the limit driving "the cumulative bribe burden on private agents  to infmity"  (Schleifer
As a consequence,  the Philippine economy and Vishny, p.  615) and bribe revenue  to zero.
stagnated  during the Aquino regime, even  recording negative growth .in some  years
A  connnon element in both the Marcos and Aquino  administrations  was the tolerance for
corruption by relatives.  Mrs.  Marcos'  blatant extortion was tolerated in part because  she was the
President's wife  and in part because of  her own  political  following  (the analogies with  Mrs.
Suharto  of Indonesia  and Evita Peron  speak  for themselves). Mrs. Aquino's brother allegedly
The striking part of these directed government spending to projects to which he then sold access
episodes was that he did so without the benefit of an official position.
Because of the excesses  of the Marcos administration in its later years and the decline in
central authority during the Aquino regime, the Philippines missed out on the 1980's  Asian growth
"miracle." 
It was not until the ~d-90's  under President  Ramos that the Philippines grew out of its
"stray cat" status [Vos and Yap,  1996; Roumasset, 1997], Ramos combined legitimacy --as  a
General in the Philippine Anny under Marcos, he opposed  the use of  force to suppress  the
People's  Revolution  --and  both the  reputation and ability  to  restore some amount of  central
The nature  of corruption,  accordingly,  became  less  burdensome In addition, Ramos authority
benefitted from the increased demand for foreign investment, especially in real estate  that was the
inevitable consequence  of  low wages and land values and high literacy/human capital relative to
other Asian NTE's.  This permits higher brib.erevenues  at lower per unit bribe "prices."
1  Marcos  did not become  "Marcos" until he  declared  martial  law in 1972.  fully 7 years  into his presidency6
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If  the Philippines is to sustain its current high rate of economic growth,  it needs to  keep
corruption not only centralized but "growth-compatible."  The coconut scam described above was
an effective pilfering  mechanism in the short-run, but in the long-run it destroyed the incentive to
invest  in coconut  fanning and  downstream  industries.
Road construction provides a similar example.  Suppose public officials  wish to collude
with construction contractors to pilfer 50% of a road contract.  Building the highway half as long
as prescribed is not an option --it  is too transparent. Instead, suppose that they collude to make
the highway  somewhat less than half  as deep (making allowance for  costs of  design, clearing,
asphalting, etc.).  The cost of keeping this operation  "secret" is that the road will  depreciate  more
than twice as fast as in the design, albeit road washouts and other types of  deterioration can be
Clearly  the inefficiency  of comIption, conveniently  blamed on acts  of nature or road misuse.
measured as waste per peso of revenue, increases  with the bribe percentage  (see figure 2). For
growth  to  be  sustained, the percentages extracted need to  be  kept  at  manageable levels  as
exemplified  by, say, Korea and the U.S!
2  The tolerable  percentage may also depend  on the nature of  the contract.  The highest percentage  take that I  have
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Figure 2: The Excess  Burden of Corruption
3.  Generalizations
In most of the corruption  literature,  the nature  of  central  government  is taken  as given.
Either authority is centralized in an honest  "principal"  government  that designs  incentive compatible
mechanisms  to  motivate corruptible bureaucrat-agents  (Rose-Ackerman,  1978),  authority is
centralized in  a  kleptocratic (Rose-Ackennan,  1996), Leviathan (Brennan and Buchanan),
monarchy (S-  V),  or authority is not centralized (and corruption is "S-  V inefficient"). As Schleifer
and Vishny themselves confess,  this approach  does not illuminate "the far deeper  question" (8- V,
p. 608) concerning  the ability of high govemnient  officials  to centralize  corruption.
The case of the Philippines suggests that legitimacy is an important determinant  of central
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authority.  Power does not, as Chainnan Mao suggested,  emanate  entirely "from  the barrel of  a
gun,"  though  legitimacy and the ability  to  monopolize violence are clearly joint  inputs  in  the
production of  central authority.  To the extent that such authority is"gun-produced," leaving it as
exogenous in economic models is understandable. But to the opposite extent, high-level and low-
level corruption  are  co-evolutionary.
High-level  or "grand" corruption may be distinguished from rent-seeking in shaping public
policies  on the basis  of whether  it is inside or outside  of the law.  Thus Imelda  Marcos' extortion
may be said to be corruption and the coconut scam said to be mere  rent-seeking.  This distinction
may turn out to be superficial  and  elusive  in practice,  however. What surreptitious threats were
used, for example, to deter opposition to new laws governing coconut policy?  It may be'  recalled,
for example, that Senator  Palaez  was shot for revealing consequences  of these  policies for coconut
farmers.  More close to home, consider the case of policies that may have been influenced by
illegal campaign contributions.
In  any case, the economic causes  of both phenomena  are very much the same, and while
there is no economic theory of grand corruption to speak of,  there is a very  distinct neoclassical
theory of political  economy that can be applied to grand coffilption as well.  Indeed, it has been
suggested above that Imelda's  larceny was very much dependent  on President  Marcos'  ability  to
maintain popular  support and the appearance  of  legitimacy about his, government.3 Since petty
corruption and grand corruption are also usefully seen  as part of the same  theory, this suggests a
Figure 3 illustrates  the unified theory of rent-seeking  which encompasses  corruption  as well.
application of neoclassical  political economy (also known as  the "economics of the third-best"; see
e.g. Roumasset, 1989, 1997) to "the deeper  problem" of how cooperation  becomes  more or less
The  downward  sloping  excess burden costs represent the S-  V  theory discussed centralized.
The upward  sloping  curve,  CCM and CCA represent the costs of  centralization under above,
Marcos and Aquino respectively. Marcos' entrepreneurial  skill and  credible commitment punishing
3  Peter Kann, now chairman of the Wall  Street Journal;once referred to Marcos'  martial law government as "smiling
martial law."  Marcos  himself  was extremely persuasive in arguing  that martial law was itself  consistent with  the
emergency power granted to the President under the Philippine constitution.
.
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conuption-seeking  independents  is represented  as a lower cost  of organizing  a sustainable  central
system of corruption.  The corresponding equilibrium of centralization  are given by CA and C M'
the  points of minimum  agency cost (sum of excess burden and centralization  cost) to the Aquino
and  Marcos  administrations  respectively.
FigJre  3: E(Jjilil:rium  Centralizatioo  d  (:aruJ:tioo
Figure  4,  illustrates  the  plausible  consequences of  centralization  and  corruption
The marginal costs of corruption,  MCA and opportunities  for the  three  regimes  discussed  above.
MCM, reflect the greater  excess  burden per unit of comIption under the more decentralized  Aquino
administration relative to that of Marcos.  The marginal cost of corruption under Ramos is shown
as even lower than that of Macros due to the opportunities to take a smaller share from the greatly
expanded private foreign investment.  In addition, the marginal benefits are drawn to  reflect the
possibility that the Marcos' and their cronies were the most avaricious in their quest for corruption
The figures are consistent with the propos~tions  that the costs of  corruption under the revenues.10
Aquino  government were greater than those under Marcos,  even if  the revenues gained from






FigJre  4: COOlp:lratiw  Carul:tioo
3.1 "Good corrui2tion"
Corruption  can be welfare enhancing when it prevents "bad"  laws  from being enforced.
Laws  that prevent voluntary exchanges  that have no third  party effects, for example, are welfare
reducing. To the extent that black markets reverse  the effects of such laws and to the extent that
corruption "greases the wheels" of those markets, corruption can be "good."
A more direct example  concerns  bribes paid to officials responsible  for allocating water in a
irrigation  systems (Wade, 1985; more generally, see  Leff,  1964). If the highest willingness-to-pay
users are the ones that end up "buying"  water from the officials, the bribe is in effect a water price
and  a transfer  payment.
:  :  MBR
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3.2 "Bad" Policies and an Iml2ossibility Theorem
Good cof11lption  results from bad policies (so may bad cof11lption,  e.g.  if  water rents are
"dissipated"  in  the  process of  influencing  officials). In the water case, for  example, the
government could  have charged for  irrigation  water in  the fIrst place or provided  transferable
entitlements.  Indeed, Japan  is said to be pursuing deregulation  as a device to reduce opportunities
for corruption  (Schesinger,  1997).
Prohibition  of alcohol  in the 1920's-U.S.  and  of mind-altering  drugs  today  is suggestive  of
a kind of prohibition "impossibility  theorem."  In the alcohol  case,  prohibition  initially reduced
consumption by  one-third and dramatically increased  the wedge between production costs and
This made it increasingly attractive for suppliers to fmd innovative ways.t{) provide sales  price.
One such method was the their product at acceptable  risks  to themselves and their customers.
As a result, alcohol consumption  approached  pre-prohibition corruption of  law enforcement.
levels even as enforcement efforts tripled (Roumasset  and Thaw, 1994).
In  general, characteristics of  some products and the  enforcement technology of  their
prohibition may be  such that increased  enforcement  expenditures  drive the wedge between
production  costs and sales price  high  enough to  motivate enough additional  corruption  that
That is, a higher effective enforcement actually declines and consumption  of the product  increases.
monetary product price is consistent  with higher sales  when the expected  punishment  is sufficiently
reduced.
The  prohibition-impossibility  theorem dramatizes the  irrationality  of  evaluating policy
proposals without evaluating their consequences  for corruption and  effective enforcement. Yet that
is exactly what economists and policy-makers alike normally do.
3.3 Incentive coffi{2atible  audits
It remains to connect  the S-  V theory ~f.  corruption and  the more traditional principal-agency
theory (Rose-Ackennan,  1978, McLaren).  To some extent these  are two sides of the same coin13
"take"  of  high  officials. A  third  step involves  liberalizing  those policies  whose  enforcement
increases  corruption. The  fourth  step  involves  auditing  systems  that  render  government
enforcement  incentive  compatible.
Since there is no such thing as a social engineer,  however, one may ask about more
It is widely  recognized that a free press and a demand for  investigative pragmatic approaches,
journalism  is one of the most effective weapons against bribery and rent-seeking generally.  The
government  can be more proactive  by improving auditing and reporting requirements  so as to
render the nature and consequences  of  government  programs, policies, and projects more
Mandating benefit-cost  analysis  and reports such as environmental transparent to the public.
impact statements  can similarly increase  transparency.  Indeed tile Australian government at one
time actually created a Transparency Agency to  monitor government programs and to  document
And  Transparency  International, based in who  gained and lost from programs and how much.
Berlin, ranks countries according to corruption as perceived by private companies  (fhe  Economist,
Aug. 2, 1997)
The more people Education offers  another way out of the stagnating sort of corruption.
understand that win-lose  strategies-  tend to generate  lose-lose results in situations where agents
repeatedly  encounter  one another, they will  be more inclined to  employ win-win  strategies
Economics and economists have an important role in this and the previously described types of
transparency14
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